This is one of the clearest to follow, most interesting accounts of a green National Guard unit going into combat early in the war and remaining committed in combat for the duration. The quoted conversations bring the situation alive to the reader.

“The impact was profound and shattering,” says the author of the engagement in which their first casualties occurred. The book goes on to tell of much action.

Of the many personal accounts of wartime combat service this may be the most readable. As an infantry officer, a platoon leader in combat in Europe, I can equate with another similar officer in the Pacific. The accounts ring true, and are vivid and understandable. In the reading you sense the emotions of conflict, particularly when his platoon is tasked to send a patrol to determine the extent of damage to an enemy-held prominent ridge. The Japanese defenders had been pounded severely with an aerial bombardment and an extensive artillery barrage that followed.

Floyd is about to lead the patrol himself when his esteemed platoon sergeant insists that it should be his role. Watching through a telescope the patrol’s advance and tragic annihilation by Japanese who emerge from deep cover, one is faced with the awful truth of infantry warfare.

The author was a friend of mine. We worked closely on committees within our class of the Army War College, graduating in 1970. We members of the group developed a high respect for Floyd Radike as a highly competent officer. In another role as a writer he earns that sort of respect as well, for this book is very readable, of professional quality, highly recommended to anyone interested in the role of infantry in the Pacific Theater of WWII, particularly National Guard units.

I was amused to learn from his widow Lydia how it happened that the lieutenant’s bars were incorrectly placed in the photograph shown as the frontispiece. She had pinned them on. And they were married the same day. Lydia helped with the editing of the book, doing a fine job, I must say.

In this narrative of Marine war dogs, the author has reconstructed his experiences with them during World War II; their training and use in the recapture of Guam in 1944. The dogs were trained “to search out the enemy hiding in the bush, detect mines and booby traps, alert troops in foxholes at night to approaching Japanese, and to carry messages, ammunition and medical supplies.”

As a young veterinarian and artillery ROTC graduate, the author accepted a commission in the Marine Corps 09 February 1943. After three months of infantry training he received orders to the War Dog Training School, at Camp Lejeune. His assignment was “to train two platoons in infantry tactics and eventually to command one overseas.” One hundred and ten Marines and 72 dogs of the 2nd and 3rd War Dog Platoons went through training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, then Camp Pendleton, California; later on Guadalcanal and then into battle on Guam.

The author commanded the Third Dog Platoon during the battle for the recapture of Guam from 21 July to 10 August 1944. Total American casualties exceeded 7,000 and an estimated 18,500 Japanese were killed. Among the dead were 25 Marine war dogs. The Marine war dogs and their handlers conducted over 550 patrols in the jungles of Guam in which forty percent of the patrols caused “the capture or killing of hundreds of enemy soldiers, over 300 by the dog handlers themselves,” and were never once ambushed.

The dogs proved so valuable on Guam that every Marine division was assigned a war dog platoon “and they paved the way for the many dogs that have followed them in the armed services, most famously in Vietnam.”

The author dedicated this book to the memory of the 2nd and 3rd War Dog Platoons, “They embodied the Marine Corps motto, Semper Fidelis.”

Lee Greenwood’s song “God Bless the USA” provides both the title of this interesting book and the lyrics that generate a thought-provoking look at how our world might have changed if WWII had gone differently. With his usual attention to detail and very intense grasp of serious aspects of war fighting and political processes, the author has put together a rather compelling scenario for a far different result from America’s war with Japan and Germany.

The first great challenge the reader must face is that of suspending knowledge of the actual outcome of WWII. Once past that, the author has created a sequence of momentous events that weave both known important persons and invented players and their decisions and actions into a certainly plausible novel.

The alternative history plays upon the actual or suspected ideology of such luminaries as the Socialist Norman Thomas as President, “American Firster” Charles Lindberg as Vice President, and pacifist Jeanette Rankin as Secretary of War.

The author then composes his novel by giving life and direction to the major antagonists and protagonists of the day, with Hitler, Von Ribbentrop, Stalin, Hirohito, Churchill, Roosevelt, and their minions, all involved in both actual and alternative scenarios. Strategic and tactical aspects of this history are described, with nuclear weapons serving as an important catalyst for much of the alternative outcome.

What makes this book capture the reader’s interest is the constant leavening of real events and detailed explanations of processes which give a sense of reality to events which are demonstrably different from what we know to be true. This effort is an easy read and provides some serious points to ponder, while at the same time a historian might find some of the concoctions a bit too simplistic or beyond reasonable likelihood. The author does a particularly important service for the less initiated by providing an Annex which compares the actual events with the alternative events, with discussion of why the alternative has been posed.

Altogether, this is a good piece of literary work and recommended reading.

Here is a book that tells it like it was, written by a company commander in the 4th Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004-2005. Capt. Brown kept thorough notes and wrote frequently to his wife and parents. All of this is collected in this book and provides the reader with a viewpoint that is invaluable. Much has been said and written about the U.S. Army in Iraq.

Those who served in any of our wars will readily recognize the various situations that Capt. Brown experienced as a staff member and, later, as commander of his company. He is not bashful about pointing out errors and/or poor planning. He and his comrades received a lot of on-the-job training, and his account is of the good and the bad and is a rare critique of war by the men whose boots were there on the ground.

In general, what we see on TV or read about the war is written by journalists and is not the first-hand account of the soldiers who are over there. Capt. Brown has done a fine job of recounting his participation in Iraq.

Wow! What a book about the Cold War and the casualties in classified recce programs! There are many misconceptions about the cost of the Cold War and American lives. In 1999 noted scientist Dr. Edward Teller wrote in The New York Times, “The Cold War had the distinction of not costing any lives.” Not so! At least 149 airmen were killed during the Cold War period. Add to that number the losses on USS Liberty and USS Pueblo, and submarines lost for unspecified reasons.

The recce programs started at the end of WWII. Aircrews flew obsolete propeller-driven planes, “the mongrels” of the fleet The U.S. knew the Soviets were not to be trusted. An ambassador stated flatly to the White House that the Baltic nations feared the Russians more than the Germans. The famous 306th Bomb Group (the unit “12 o’clock High” was based on) started flying “Casey Jones” missions to photo recce all of middle and eastern Europe just 34 days after the war in Europe ended. The USN took a “Privateer” recce plane to Siberia three months after the Pacific war ended, And the Brits? They flew twin-engine jet recce missions all the way to the Baltic and to Moscow! That rattled Soviet air defense officers badly. There was a major difference in these recce missions as opposed to practice bombing and refueling missions by SAC. The Russians knew those missions were practice. They left them alone. However, this was not the case with recce birds. They became fair game.

In spite of equipment limitations, the crews were efficient. Ancient C-54s roamed up and down the borders of Eastern Europe, monitoring the radar systems. The Russians knew that to detect their radar the recce birds had to approach close enough to give them reason to turn the systems on. When they did, then the fighters would scramble. Many Soviet pilots were furious because they knew the planes deliberately remained out of range of AAA. Thus, the shootdowns came from Russian fighters, who in most cases shot down unarmed planes, such as a C130 not far from the Turkish border.

The photo capabilities were superb as the state of the art improved. An RB-36 made clear photos of golf balls from 35,000 feet over Fort Worth. Their pictures on the Baltic were first-class. Intelligence can glean much information from changes in runway length, or whether buildings are used in winter when no snow is on the roofs.

Much of this program, especially in Europe, was caged “BIG SAFARI.” I happened to have been a minor part of it, not in Europe, many years later. The author goes into specific missions where planes were shot down. Intelligence knew there were survivors. What happened to them? Those crews are part of the “missing mosaic” of their fellows who did not come back from Viet-Nam.

Some called these crews “Ravens,” because the ravens “steal.” That’s what they did, and did very well in intelligence collection, as Burrows shows so well, at the cost of good men’s lives.

Their accomplishments are awesome. I would like to see this book in more libraries, especially on the bases — it’s a keeper!

“C-Rations For The Warrior’s Heart” is a collection of 20 stories about “men from different branches of the Armed Forces who put their lives on the line.” The majority of the stories are about WWII followed by Viet-Nam, Korea and Desert Storm. Most of the stories are by the author, a few by the individual himself. As noted by one Marine mentioned in both this book and Robert Boardman’s “Unforgettable Men in Unforgettable Times,” the stories “clearly reveal that the key element in winning wars resides inside the spirit of man.”

Although most histories of the Viet-Nam War provide little attention to the Cambodian campaign, it is the author’s conclusion that it was one of the most successful operations of the Viet-Nam War. The focus of the campaign has been on the domestic protest it caused and the killing of four students at Kent State University by National Guard troops.

In this narrative, the author provides the military prospective and explains how this campaign was a well planned and executed offensive that eliminated North Vietnamese Army sanctuaries and supply bases less than 100 miles from Saigon.

The primary focus is on the operations of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Infantry Division. The author writes, “Unlike the First Cavalry Division… the 25th Infantry Division became involved only after Nixon ordered the incursion expanded…”

According to the author, the army units were well adjusted to the environment and well commanded by General Creighton Abrams. The carefully planned and executed ground offensive provided the essential support of a “decent interval” and “peace with honor” strategy of President Nixon.

Although critics of the campaign claimed the NVA never did attack out of Cambodia, the author provides a persuasive rebuttal that the threat from Cambodia was real. The campaign probably delayed the eventual defeat of South Viet-Nam for a year or more. The result of the campaign was an operational victory that was a major achievement for American troops in the Viet-Nam War.

In “Castles of Steel,” Pulitzer Prize winning author Robert K. Massie follows up his previous work, “Dreadnaught,” with perhaps the finest book ever written on the subject of the naval history of the First World War. While “Dreadnaught” provides an understanding of the arms race that led to the buildup of the British and German Navies prior to the Great War, “Castles of Steel” gives the reader a detailed review of both the military and political aspects of World War I at sea. Throughout the war, the two great navies maneuvered to fight on their own terms. Dependent on merchant shipping for food and other critical imports, as well as for the transportation of Commonwealth forces from various nations of the Empire, the numerically superior Royal Navy could accept nothing less than total control of the sea. At the same time, the British imposed a naval blockade of Germany. Led by the likes of Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) and Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty, the British aggressively sought to force a showdown with the German High Seas Fleet to eliminate it altogether.

The German Navy, at the insistence of Kaiser Wilhelm, took a much more conservative approach to naval warfare. Outnumbered across the board in all ship types, the Germans sought to whittle down the larger Royal Navy through a series of combats designed to isolate and destroy smaller units of the Grand Fleet. Their plan was to lure the British units, especially their battle cruisers, on chases where they could be ambushed by the bulk of the German High Seas Fleet. It was one such action that led to the Battle of Jutland, the largest single naval battle of the First World War. Particularly interesting are the impacts of (then) advances in science/technology and naval architecture upon both navies. Among the technologies used for the first time in WWI were shipboard radio for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications, aircraft and airships for scouting and the direction of naval gunfire, gathering of intelligence through interception of radio messages, and the use of fuel-oil powered ships. The First World War also saw the first use of primitive aircraft carriers and widespread employment of submarines as offensive weapons. As Massie explains, it was the decision of the Germans to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare, the sinking of ships regardless of nationality without warning, that led the United States into the war in 1917.

As a military historian myself, I find the most impressive aspect of Massie’s work to be the sheer quantity and unmatched quality of his research. As a writer, however, I am in awe at his ability to incorporate the information he has painstakingly gathered into a seamless, high-energy page-tuner. Combining biographical sketches of the larger-than-life personalities who shaped the Great War at sea with historical fact and anecdotal recollections has produced one of the most compelling military history books I’ve ever had the pleasure to read. I recommend reading “Dreadnaught,” however, before reading “Castles of Steel.” To do so is not absolutely necessary, but will provide the reader with a great deal of insight into the formation of the opposing fleets and associated political intrigue.

In 1960, the author of this personal narrative was a college student attending Regis College in Denver, Colorado, when he enlisted in the Marine Corps Platoon Leaders class (PLC). As a PLC, the he was required to attend two six-week sessions of officers training during his summer break from college. Readers familiar with Marine Corps recruit training will note the difference for potential officers and the Marine recruit. On 3 June 1963, the author received his degree from Regis and a commission in the Marine Corps.

After completing Officers Basic School at Quantico, Virginia, the author was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines preparing for deployment to Okinawa. During its second deployment to Okinawa, the 7th Marines were ordered to land in Viet-Nam. After landing in Viet-Nam, the author relates his experiences, particularly in the area of Hill 76 and around No Name Village. The reader will find the author’s experiences similar to many personal narrative of this genre.

Discharged from the Marine Corps in 1977 after his return from Viet-Nam, the author was, true to his word, “A Civilian in Green Clothes.”

The book contains 206 pages, four maps of poor quality, 11 black and white photographs, with no table of contents or index.

Authors Landis and Gunn were on Oahu 7 December 1941 and were thus witnesses to the Japanese attack, Landis at the Pearl Harbor Sub Base as a junior member of Admiral Kimmel’s staff and Gunn at the Signal Corps Radar Filter Center at Fort Shafter. Unfortunately, their small roles in these events do not provide them any special insights and these shortcomings are all too obvious in this book.

Lt. Cmdr. Landis uses two events as the centerpieces of his thesis that President Roosevelt knew the exact details of the Japanese attack and chose to ignore them so that America could use the attack as our excuse to enter the war. He goes on to suggest it was really Hitler and Germany that Roosevelt wanted to defeat, and he used Japan’s attack to bring Germany into the war because of their treaty obligation to Japan. He cites “the President’s” direction that three picket vessels be prepared and sailed to the Far East in hopes the Japanese would sink them as one example of Roosevelt’s determination to precipitate congressional outrage and a declaration of war. Only one of these vessels actually sailed and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor negated this supposed ploy.

The other example of Roosevelt’s alleged conspiracy is a “transcript,” supposedly taken from German espionage files after the war, of a 26 November 1941 scrambler phone conservation between Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in which Churchill relates exact details of the 7 December attack. Neither of these two supposed acts of complicity and deceit is supported by citations or research in a manner that even remotely validates their authenticity. In fact, the Japanese decision to attack and the exact date were not decided until 1 December 1941. Virtually everything that follows is ground already plowed many times.

While Landis cites several books about the attack and rehashes the theory that Roosevelt allowed over 2,000 American to die rather that meet the attack he knew was coming, his research is virtually nonexistent. From the very outset author Landis makes clear he is fatally biased; he can find absolutely no fault with Admirals Nimitz or Kimmel, and can find nothing good in Admiral King or Generals MacArthur or Marshall. He asserts that, despite a number of Congressional and military investigations over the past 50 years, a clever and massive conspiracy led by “The Democratic Party” and facilitated by King, Marshall, MacArthur and literally thousands of others, has covered for Roosevelt’s duplicity.

The text suffers significantly from poor editing, with grammatical, format and contextual errors detracting from both credibility and readability. While there is some interesting anecdotal reading here, the total lack of scholarship and definitive research, coupled with the many editorial lapses, completely cancels any objectivity the book might otherwise have contained. This book cannot be taken seriously by those interested in the Pearl Harbor attack.